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NOTES
prior jurisprudence" clearly establish that the legitimate portion of
a forced heir cannot be encumbered with conditions. But when the
donor bequeaths more than the legitimate portion, he perhaps could
attach any lawful conditions which would apply to the bequest as a
whole.85 Should the heir dispute the condition, transfer of the forced
portion is unaffected." If the legatee takes without disputing the
condition, it is assumed that he takes all of the legacy subject to the
condition. Should he then fail to meet the requirements of that con-
dition, transfer of the disposable portion would be precluded,"
although the legatee is still entitled to receive the forced portion.
The minimal impact of Baten is to sanction brief suspensively
conditional legacies. More broadly, the decision demonstrates a fairly
liberal attitude, favoring freedom of testation, which may be
manifested in subsequent cases in this area. The tendency seems to
be to afford such dispositions a presumption of validity which will
stand unless denied by a specific prohibition, and applicable prohibi-
tions will be narrowly construed. To uphold the will in Baten, the
court had to dispel some entrenched misconceptions concerning
several ancient doctrines. That it was able to do so while clarifying
the underlying principles of those doctrines is commendable.
Daryl H. Owen
Davis v. Passman: A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The plaintiff brought suit seeking damages' alleging that Con-
gressman Otto Passman had discriminated against her on the basis
of sex by firing plaintiff from her position as his deputy ad-
ministrative assistant.! The United States Supreme Court, reversing
84. See, e.g., Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880); Chase v. Matthew's
Executors, 12 La. 357 (1838).
85. Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218, 1220 (1880).
86. Id.
87. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1698 (legacy is invalid if the legatee dies before the con-
dition can be fulfilled).
1. The petitioner also sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement, but
Congressman Passman's election defeat rendered this claim moot.
2. The federal district court sustained the respondent's Federal Rules of Civil




the Fifth Circuit,3 held that redress in damages for a fifth amend-
ment violation may be implied directly from the due process clause
when no alternative forms of relief are available." Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
The implication of private causes of action from public law is not
a new jurisprudential discovery but dates from the origins of the
Anglo-American legal system. The idea that individuals should be
able to enforce, judicially, provisions of public law that do not ex-
pressly grant private remedies is as old as the Magna Carta itself.'
Moreover, the conceptual distinction between public and private law
has been challenged repeatedly in the federal courts.' In many cases,
litigants desiring private remedies have had to argue that the
courts may and should infer private causes of action from provisions
that apparently were originally written to allow enforcement only
on behalf of the public at large.7 Federal trial and appellate courts
over the years have recognized these implied causes of action in cer-
tain circumstances in cases based both on federal statutes and on
the Constitution itself.'
In several instances the federal courts have allowed actions for
remedies other than damages in suits based on federal statutes
which did not explicitly provide individual remedies.' In addition,
3. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held
that the plaintiff had no private right of action under the fifth amendment. A panel of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977), and was
ultimately overruled by an en banc decision of the same court. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.
1978).
4. After remand to the district court, the suit on the merits was settled out of
court for an undisclosed amount. See Washington Post, Aug. 25, 1979, at 9, col. 5.
5. The Great Charter drew no distinction between private law and limits on
governmental action. In addition, statutes that were passed during the reign of Ed-
ward I and flexible forms of action developed later in the courts recognized enforce-
ment by individuals of limits on sovereign authority. See Katz, The Jurisprudence of
Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1, 9-23 (1968). See generally T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW, 20-40, 106-56, 424-83 (1956).
6. Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrak
and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 53, 53 (1975).
7. See Katz, supra note 5, at 2-5.
8. On implication generally, see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Con-
stitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969); Katz, supra note 5.
9. For example, an individual plaintiff was awarded injunctive relief against an
agent who allegedly had sold securities through fraudulent misrepresentations and
concealments in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933. Deckert v. In-
dependence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940). Similarly, the Supreme Court in 1944,
finding that the right of a class not to be discriminated against could fairly be inferred
from the Railway Labor Act, awarded equitable relief to a black plaintiff by enjoining
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these courts have also found implied actions for monetary damages
in statutes which did not expressly authorize relief." In deriving
these remedies from federal regulatory law, the courts generally
have allowed a private action for the breach of a statutory duty
when the remedy is consistent with the purpose of the legislation
and when the statute expresses no contrary legislative intent." A
recent implication case, Cort v. Ash,"2 articulated the standards that
the Court has used to determine whether or not a cause of action for
damages is implied in a particular federal statute. In refusing to
hold that a stockholder's derivative suit for damages was implicit in
a criminal statute prohibiting certain political campaign activities,
the Court asked: 1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, such that the statute
creates a right in favor of the plaintiff? 2) Is there an indication of
legislative intent to create or deny a remedy? 3) Is implication con-
sistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme? and 4) Is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law in an area
basically the concern of the state, so that it would be inappropriate
to base a cause of action on federal law?"
the enforcement of a discriminatory labor contract that had been entered into by a
bargaining representative who had been chosen under the Act. Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
10. For example, in the first statutory implication case, the Supreme Court in
1916 found that an employee of an interstate railway company was within the protec-
tion of the Federal Safety Appliance Act and allowed him an implied right of action
against his employer for injuries caused by the employer's failure to comply with
federal safety regulations. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In a
later case the Supreme Court allowed a private right of action for monetary damages
against a corporation that allegedly had violated the proxy rules of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
11. See Katz, supra note 5, at 31.
12. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
13. In one recent case that discussed the Cort criteria, a woman who was allegedly
denied admission to two medical schools on the basis of sex was found to have the
right to pursue private actions against the universities under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). For
criticism of the Cort standards, see Justice Powell's dissent in the case. 441 U.S. at 730
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that the criteria are so broad as to allow
the judiciary to legislate and that the Cort test has produced a flood of statutory im-
plication claims. Justice Powell's Cannon view is reflected in a recent case that sug-
gests that the Court has abandoned the Cort approach in favor of a closer examination
of legislative intent. Writing for the Court in denying a private damages remedy under
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Justice Stewart, relying on Touche Ross & Co,
v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979), for criticism of the Cort standards, argued that
the Court, instead of examining the desirability of implying private rights of action in
order to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, as it had done in previous cases,
should restrict its inquiry to the intent of Congress to authorize such a remedy. Trans-
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The constitutional limits on governmental activity also have
been sources of implied remedies. Federal courts have allowed
private actions when individual rights may be inferred from con-
stitutional provisions, if alternative forms of relief are lacking or in-
adequate.14 This extension of public law has most commonly oc-
curred in actions for relief other than damages.15 Until recently, the
federal judiciary has been reluctant to allow individual plaintiffs to
collect damages for violations of constitutional rights unless specific
statutory or constitutional declarations grant a right to recovery.8
Damage remedies have been inferred in only a few instances. 7 In
none of these cases was monetary relief implied absent some in-
dependent authority. 8
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
america Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). In dissent, four justices,
White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, wrote that the Cort standards should have
been applied. 100 S. Ct. at 25 (White, J., dissenting). It is left for future decisions to
determine whether or not the Supreme Court will continue to apply the stricter stan-
dard. See note 70, infra.
14. See Dellinger, supra note 8; Hill, supra note 8; Katz, supra note 5.
15. One Supreme Court decision allowed ejectment as a remedy for violation of
the constitutional provision prohibiting the taking of private property without just
compensation. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954), when minor plaintiffs filed a class action suit seeking to enforce their fifth
amendment right to be admitted to public schools on a non-segregated basis, the Court
authorized the application of equitable principles in fashioning judicial decrees aimed
at eliminating obstacles to desegregation. Suppression of evidence obtained as a result
of searches and seizures that violate the fourth amendment also gives rise to an im-
plied remedy. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (cases in state courts); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (cases in federal courts),
16. For discussion of the reluctance to imply damage remedies, see Dellinger,
supra note 8, at 1542-43; Hill, supra note 8, at 1142.
17. In two cases decided at the turn of the century, the high court allowed actions
for damages based on the constitutional right to vote. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S.
487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900). A later case similarly allowed monetary
recovery for voting right violations. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). The only
other case prior to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to infer a right to money damages for a breach of constitu-
tional liberties involved the Supreme Court's award of relief under the fifth amend-
ment for land flooded as the result of a federal water project. Jacobs v. United States,
290 U.S. 13 (1933).
18. In the Swafford, Wiley, and Nixon cases, though the Court stated that it was
inferring a right to sue for recovery directly from the Constitution, specific statutory
provisions authorized such relief. Jacobs can be distinguished from pure implication
cases in that the fifth amendment itself authorizes compensation when property is
taken for public use. See Note, The Truly Constitutional Tort, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 271,
282 (1971); Note, Judicial Creation of a Federal Cause of Action for Damages for




Narcotics,9 was a watershed case2" in the area of implied causes of
action for damages for violations of individual constitutional liber-
ties. In Bivens, the plaintiff sought redress in federal court for a
search that allegedly had been made by federal agents in violation
of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court inferred a damage
remedy directly from the amendment, noting the historical role of
damages as the ordinary remedy for violations of personal rights. 1
The Court stated that the case involved "no special factors coun-
selling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."22
Moreover, the Court did not frame the issue as being whether
money damages were necessary to the enforcement of the fourth
amendment. Noting the absence of an explicit congressional state-
ment that those in petitioner's situation must be limited to other
remedies found to be equally effective by Congress,23 the Court
stated, "The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can
demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal
agents of his fourth amendment rights, is entitled to redress his in-
jury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in
the federal courts."2 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice
Harlan argued that the federal courts have authority to infer
private damage remedies from public law and that, in deciding
19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Court found that a suit to recover
compensation for a fourth amendment violation by federal agents stated a claim aris-
ing under federal law, giving rise to federal question jurisdiction. Although the ques-
tion of whether or not a cause of action for monetary relief was available was not
before the Court, in dictum the Court said, "It is . . . well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, a federal court may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done." Id. at 684. This dictum has been cited by subsequent decisions, including
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, and Davis, 442 U.S. at 245, as authority for the proposition
that causes of action for monetary redress of breaches of constitutional rights should
be inferred in appropriate situations. Ironically, Justice Black, the author of Bell,
dissented in Bivens, objecting to Bivens' extension of Bell beyond the jurisdictional
issue.
In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a case involving a suit by a former
registered futures commission merchant against the Department of Agriculture and
others, seeking damages for wrongful initiation of administrative proceedings, the
Court's discussion of Bivens was limited to a statement that a compensable injury to a
constitutionally protected interest could be vindicated in a suit for damages based
upon the general federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. at 486. The
Court's Bivens discussion, however, was dicta, as the case was decided on an immunity
issue.
21. 403 U.S. at 395.
22. Id. at 396.
23. Id. at 397.
24. Id.
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whether or not to infer a cause of action, the federal judiciary
should weigh the same policies that a legislature would and should
award relief " ' necessary' or 'appropriate' to the vindication of the
interest involved.
2 5
Although Bivens recognized a monetary remedy for a constitu-
tional violation, several questions fundamental to further application
of Bivens were left unanswered by the Court. First, must the courts
recognize a remedy in damages whenever there is a violation of con-
stitutional rights and a plaintiff is without an effective remedy, or
may courts exercise the legislative discretion that Justice Harlan
endorsed? Additionally, if a remedy is not constitutionally compelled,
what criteria should the courts use to decide whether or not an im-
plied remedy exists? Also, to what extent does the availability of
other remedies preclude damages?" Finally, under what conditions
can the Bivens rationale be extended to other constitutional provi-
sions?
Subsequent federal appellate decisions have done little to ex-
plain Bivens.2 7 Such explanation is needed, as the lower federal
courts have already extended Bivens to the first,28 fifth,' sixth, 0
eighth, 1 ninth," thirteenth," and fourteenth" amendments.
In Davis a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, extending Bivens, held that a damages remedy was in-
25. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. For a unique approach to the question, consider Circuit Judge Roney's concur-
ring opinion in Davis, when the case was decided by the en banc Fifth Circuit, 571
F.2d at 802 (Roney, J., concurring), in which he argued that the Bivens rationale should
be limited to pre-constitutional torts- violations of constitutional provisions that pro-
tect rights that were recognized at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.
Distinguishing Davis from Bivens, Judge Roney wrote:
In this case, however, no similar right is at stake. The defendant has not in-
truded upon a liberty interest with preconstitutional origins .... But the Constitu-
tion has allegedly given her a right not to be fired on the basis of her sex. This
right is not, however, a protected inherent right, but a right "created" by the
Constitution, a right which in fact encroaches upon what was historically viewed
as an inherent right of her employer.
Id. The Davis holding, of course, implicitly rejects this limitation.
27. See cases cited in notes 29-34, infra. Generally, these decisions quote the Bell
dictum, see note 20, supra, but offer no interpretation of Bivens.
28. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
29, See, e.g., Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State Marine Lines,
Inc. v. Shulz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d
Cir. 1972).
30. See, e.g., Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D. D.C. 1976).
31. See, e.g., Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
32. See, e.g., Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
33. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975).
34. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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ferrable directly from the fifth amendment whenever a plaintiff was
otherwise remediless 5 The decision was overruled in an en banc
rehearing,"6 wherein the court found that Davis had no implied ac-
tion for damages. The Fifth Circuit on rehearing applied the criteria
that the Supreme Court had fashioned in Cort v. Ash to decide
whether or not to infer a private damages remedy and found that
the infringement of Davis' due process rights was not sufficient to
justify a Bivens remedy, that Congress, in enacting section 717 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, intended those in the petitioner's posi-
tion to be without legal redress, and that the recognition of a
damages remedy for due process violations would create "the
danger of deluging federal courts with claims otherwise redressable
in state courts. 37
Reversing the court of appeals, Justice Brennan, writing for a
five-member majority,8 found that the Fifth Circuit applied the
wrong test in deciding whether or not Davis had an enforceable
right." The majority stated that the issue before the court of ap-
peals in deciding whether or not a cause of action existed was "a
question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of
litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the
power of the court."'" The Court determined that in deciding this
35. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978).
37. Id. at 800.
38. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion.
39. 442 U.S. at 241.
40. Id. at n.18. The majority also stated that the court of appeals had confused the
issue of standing, which involves inquiry into the extent of the plaintiff's injury, with
the question of the existence of a cause of action, which deals with the nature of the
right that the petitioner asserts. Id. In applying the first Cort criterion, which ad-
dresses the special benefit conferred on the plaintiff by a particular statute, the court
of appeals found that Davis' rights were violated, but not to the extent that Bivens'
had been. 571 F.2d at 797. The Supreme Court found that this approach improperly
looked to the extent of the plaintiffs injury to determine the existence of a cause of
action. 442 U.S. at 241 n.18. The Court also stated that the court of appeals had found
that the petitioner had no cause of action in the sense that those in the petitioner's
position were not able to enforce the due process right asserted. 442 U.S. at 241. This
statement is at the least misleading and arguably incorrect. The Fifth Circuit did find
that a damages remedy was not available to those in petitioner's position but left open
the possibility that an equitable remedy might be available to congressional employees
discharged on unconstitutional grounds: "Denying an implied cause of action for money
damages does not render meaningless any constitutional rights of congressional
employees. A plaintiff might still seek equitable relief where the employer remained in
office .... " 571 F.2d at 800. If the court of appeals had found that the petitioner did
not have a cause of action to enforce the due process rights that she asserted, as the
Supreme Court said the lower court did, 442 U.S. at 241, then an equitable remedy
19801
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issue the court of appeals should not have applied the Cort
statutory implication standards,' because that test inquires into con-
gressional intent, a factor essential to statutory interpretation but
irrelevant to constitutional construction." Instead of seeking
legislative intent, the Court examined the basis of the petitioner's
claim and found a cause of action implied directly by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, because the plaintiff's complaint
alleged a violation of her fifth amendment rights and the petitioner
had no effective extra-judicial means to invoke the protection given
by the amendment."
In deciding that the plaintiffs complaint presented appropriate
circumstances for monetary compensation, the Court ruled that in
this case: 1) relief in damages was appropriate because a damages
remedy is "the ordinary remedy for invasion of personal interests in
liberty," and was judicially manageable, while no other redress was
available to Davis;" 2) the concerns arising from the fact that the
defendant was a congressman were co-extensive with the protection
afforded him under the Speech or Debate Clause; 5 3) Congress has
not expressly declared that a congressional employee discharged as
a result of sex discrimination cannot recover;'6 and 4) extension of a
necessarily would have been precluded. The Supreme Court's characterization of the Fifth
Circuit's disposition of the issue is correct only if the phrase "those in petitioner's posi-
tion" refers only to unconstitutionally discharged congressional employees whose
employers have left office. Chief Justice Burger objected to the suggestion that were
Congressman Passman still in office, a federal court could order him, under penalty of
contempt, to rehire the petitioner. 442 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The ma-
jority intimated no view on this question. 442 U.S. at 241 n.24.
41. Some commentators, arguing that the federal courts function under the same
legislative authorization and conduct the same balancing analysis whether interpreting
constitutional or statutory material, challenge the notion that the courts should not use
statutory implication reasoning in interpreting the Constitution. Dellinger, supra note
8, at 1545; Katz, supra note 5, at 39-43.
42. 442 U.S. at 241.
43. Id. at 243.
44. Id. at 245, quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).
45. Article I, Section 6 of the United States Constitution states of senators and
representatives: "and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other place."
46. Section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972 by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, prohibits discrimination in federal employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and provides for en-
forcement by the Civil Service Commission and the federal district courts. Davis was
unable to invoke the provisions of section 717 because it specifically excludes from its
protection government employees in non-competitive service. The court of appeals en
banc opinion found that Congress intended section 717 to be the exclusive remedy for
discrimination in federal employment and that those in petitioner's position were ex-
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damages remedy to violations of due process would not expand the
scope of federal jurisdiction so radically that the federal courts
would be flooded with claims of compensable injuries caused by
violations of due process.47 The Court then remanded the case for
disposition of the defendant's claim to Speech or Debate Clause im-
munity. 8
The Court's opinion does little to explain further the Bivens
decision and implication of private causes of action from public law.
Instead, the decision raises several difficult issues of its own and
leaves unanswered some of the more important questions raised by
Bivens.
One difficulty with the Davis opinion stems from the fact that
the Court decided the case without deciding the issue of justiciabili-
ty,45 essential to the determination of whether or not petitioner
Davis should have been allowed a cause of action for money
damages. The justiciability issue, as it arose in the instant case,
arguably involved two relateA aspects. The first was the extent to
cluded from its provisions. In so concluding, the court of appeals relied on Brown v.
General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), which held that Congress intended
section 717 to create an exclusive, preemptive scheme for the redress of federal
employment discrimination. The appellate court, applying the Cort statutory implica-
tion criteria to Davis, denied a cause of action for damages, their denial based in part
upon Congress' adoption of section 717. 571 F.2d at 798. Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Davis disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's evaluation of the scope and intent
of section 717, maintaining that Congress did not exclude expressly alternative
remedies. Although Justice Brennan's conclusion is "suspect"-as Justice Powell in
dissent pointed out, 442 U.S. at 254 (Powell, J., dissenting), given Brown's holding and
Congress' explicit exclusion of non-competitive employees from the statute's employ-
ment discrimination provisions-the outcome of the investigation of congressional in-
tent is perhaps not as important to future litigants as is the question that is raised by
the fact of the inquiry: If the Davis damages remedy is constitutionally compelled and
cannot be precluded by congressional intent to leave the petitioner remediless, see
text at notes 62-64, infra, why did Justice Brennan feel compelled to look to the intent
behind section 717?
47. The Court rejected this potition with three arguments. First, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976) is already available to afford redress to due process violations which occur
under state law. In addition, the court did "not hold that every tort by a federal of-
ficial may be redressed in damages," 442 U.S. at 248, and Congress might obviate the
need for such relief by providing "equally effective alternative remedies," id. Finally,
considerations of judicial economy should not thwart the protection of constitutional
rights. Id.
48. See note 4, supra, for the disposition of the case.
49. Justiciability generally concerns the question of whether or not a controversy
is the type that should be entrusted to the courts for resolution. "In deciding generally
whether a claim is justiciable, a court must determine whether 'the duty asserted can
be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for
the right asserted can be judicially molded."' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517
(1969), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1966).
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which the Speech or Debate Clause barred inquiry into the de-
fendant's firing of Davis." The second aspect concerned the degree
to which judicial examination of congressional employment practices
is barred by the principle of separation of powers." The Court,
however, treated the separation of powers claim as "co-extensive
with the protections afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause,"" and
remanded the case for a determination of the extent of Speech or
Debate Clause protection."
Regardless of the merits of the Speech or Debate Clause argu-
ment, 4 its consideration is arguably necessary to a determination of
50. Legislative Speech or Debate Clause immunity has been construed narrowly
by the Court, which has noted that the protection does not extend to all conduct
relating to legislative activities, but only "protects against inquiry into acts that occur
in the regular course of the legislative process and the motivation for those acts."
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). A congressman's employment
decisions regarding staff members whose positions are basically clerical might be held
to be outside of the protection accorde-d -at-s---W--ithirr-the regular course of the
legislative process, but the Court's disposition of the case postponed determination of
the nature of Davis' duties and their relevance to Speech or Debate Clause immunity.
51. Chief Justice Burger wrote that the principle of separation of powers made
this case non-justiciable because the employment of congressional staff members in-
volves political decisions committed to the discretion of congressmen. 442 U.S. at 249
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the
bar to inquiry arises when there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department ...." 442 U.S. at 242, quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Arguably, review of Congressman Passman's
decision was barred by one or more of these considerations. After Baker v. Carr, the
Court decided Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), which strictly construed the
Baker v. Carr criteria of non-justiciability and indicated that the Court will not refuse
to review all congressional decisions dealing with internal practices. The Court in
Davis, for the first time, held that the protection afforded by the principle of separa-
tion of powers extends no farther than the protection afforded by the Speech or
Debate Clause. The correctness of this holding is arguable. See note 53, infra.
52. 442 U.S. at 246.
53. The Court equated the Speech or Debate Clause and separation of powers
issues, stating: "Second, although a suit against a Congressman for putatively un-
constitutional actions taken in the course of his official conduct does raise special con-
cerns counselling hesitation, we hold that these concerns are coextensive with the pro-
tections afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause." 442 U.S. at 246. The advisability of
this equation is arguable. Justice Powell wrote that this assertion was "a striking
departure from precedent." 442 U.S. at 253 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
argued that the Court ignored the fact that "[olur constitutional structure of govern-
ment rests on a variety of checks and balances." Id. (emphasis added). The majority, he
stated, acted as if the Speech or Debate Clause were the only check. Id. Chief Justice
Burger in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist also viewed
the two issues as distinct. 442 U.S. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
54. Chief Justice Burger in dissent reached the merits of this issue. For him,
because of the issue of separation of powers, "judicial power in this area is cir-
cumscribed." 442 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Curiously, Justice Powell, in
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the ultimate issue in Davis. It is disturbing that the Court, when
presented with two issues of constitutional significance, decided the
question of a cause of action for damages but remanded the case for
hearing on the justiciability issue, which had been briefed fully by
both petitioner and respondent." The Speech or Debate question is
no less important than the matter actually heard; a decision for
respondent on the issue would have been dispositive of the case. It
would seem that the Court should determine, before deciding
whether or not to infer a damages remedy, whether or not the contro-
versy can be adjudicated at all. Although it has been stated that the
Court will neither decide a question of constitutional law before its
decision is necessary nor pass upon a properly presented constitu-
tional question when a case can be resolved by ruling on an issue of
general or statutory law,56 it was not necessary to do either here.
The Court explained in Davis that it heard the issues that it did in
order to avoid imposing "additional litigative burdens" on the
respondent. 7 It is arguable, however, that hearing the Speech or
Debate Clause issue might have relieved the respondent of
"litigative burdens" by making further consideration of the peti-
tioner's case unnecessary. 8
In the interests of judicial efficiency, the Court could have taken
one of two courses of action. It could have vacated the judgment of
the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court or
court of appeals for resolution of the Speech or Debate Clause issue.
Or, alternatively, the Court itself could have decided that question.
The Court, however, believed that a refusal to decide the cause of
action and remedy questions might also create unnecessary
litigative burdens."
dissent, professed not to reach the merits of the Speech or Debate Clause argument,
442 U.S. at 254 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting), despite the fact that he joined in Chief
Justice Burger's opinion, which did reach the merits. The Chief Justice and Justice
Rehnquist also joined Justice Powell's dissenting opinion.
55. Brief for Respondent at 21-30. Brief for Petitioner at 50-62.
56. In his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936),
Justice Brandeis articulated seven rules that, he argued, the Court had developed to
determine whether or not it would hear a constitutional question that had been placed
before it for decision. Id. at 346-48. The second and fourth rules are, respectively,
"[tjhe Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it"' and "[tihe Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of." Id. at 346-47.
57. 442 U.S. at 236 n.11.
58. Justice Stewart made this argument in his dissent. 442 U.S. at 251 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's opinion.
59. 442 U.S. at 236 n.11.
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Davis does ndt expressly establish standards for determining
when a damages remedy is appropriate relief for violation of a con-
stitutional right and can be read as supporting either the proposi-
tion that some remedy is compelled by the Constitution or the argu-
ment that a court may exercise something akin to legislative discre-
tion in deciding when to grant damages. The Court, considering the
propriety of a damages remedy and the possibility of a deluge of
due process claims, appeared to address policy considerations, as a
legislature would. ° Furthermore, the holding that separation of
powers concerns are co-extensive with the reach of the Speech or
Debate Clause may have been a product of evaluating competing
policies. 1 Likewise, the Court's treatment of congressional intent
may support the inference that the Court was exercising a principled
discretion, willing to take congressional intent into consideration,
when appropriate, as one factor to be weighed in making a policy
determination. Thus, from the finding that Congress did not ex-
pressly preclude monetary relief for those in petitioner's position, it
might be inferred that if Congress had so intended, such a fact
would be entitled to consideration in deciding whether or not a
damage remedy should be granted.
By concluding that Congress did not intend to foreclose relief to
congressional employees, the Court avoided deciding whether or not
Congress has the authority to preclude a remedy altogether.
Logically, of course, if a remedy for a constitutional violation is con-
stitutionally compelled, there would be no need to decide whether
60. The Court found "the most fundamental answer" to the "deluge" argument in
a quotation from Justice Harlan: "Current limitations upon the effective functioning of
the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in the
way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles." Id. at 248, quoting
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 411
(Harlan, J., concurring). It might be argued from this passage that the Court considers
some remedy for a constitutional violation to be constitutionally compelled, irrespec-
tive of any effect on swollen dockets. Thus, it is possible that in discussing the
"deluge" argument the Court was not really confronting the problem of swollen
dockets, but was in fact dismissing it as irrelevant.
61. Justice Powell's dissent seems to indicate otherwise. He wrote: "Among those
policies that a court certainly should consider in deciding whether to imply a constitu-
tional right of action is that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of
government." 442 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., dissenting). To him, the Court's decision
"avoids our obligation to take into account the range of policy and constitutional con-
siderations that a legislature is expected to ponder in determining whether a particu-
lar remedy should be enacted." Id. at 254. However, it is arguable that the Court did
weigh such considerations and, for the majority, the overriding policy consideration
was that "[nlo man in this country is so high that he is above the law." Id. at 246,
quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978), quoting United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
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Congress intended to foreclose relief, because Congress would have
no such power. Thus, the Court's examination of congressional in-
tent may mean that the remedy is not constitutionally compelled.2
The Court avoided the constitutional question, but the failure of
Davis to state that congressional intent is irrelevant in deciding
whether or not to infer a damages remedy does not foreclose the
possibility that some remedy is constitutionally compelled. The
Court, which usually avoids deciding issues not necessary to resolv-
ing the case before it,"3 need not have addressed the question of
Congress' power to foreclose redress, inasmuch as the Court found
that Congress had not tried to exercise any such power. Thus, the
Court's treatment of congressional intent may not have been part of
a legislative-like balancing, but rather an attempt to avoid a con-
stitutional collision with a coordinate branch of government."4
Though Davis hints that the Bivens remedy is not constitutionally
compelled, there are also strong indications that the Davis Court is
stating that there must be a remedy available to redress violations
of constitutional rights. After disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit rul-
ing that a damages remedy was not implied in this case, the Court
stated:
And, unless such rights are to become merely precatory, the
class of those litigants who allege that their own constitutional
rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no ef-
fective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights,
must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for
the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights."5
62. See note 46, supra.
63. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
64. If some remedy is constitutionally compelled, then there is no need to examine
congressional intent; in that case, the Court's consideration of congressional intent
arguably indicates that a remedy is not constitutionally compelled. But given the fact
that the Fifth Circuit's opinion was in large measure based on the view that Congress
intended to preclude such relief, the Supreme Court had to address the issue and could
reach the result it did by finding that Congress did not intend to foreclose relief or,
alternatively, by finding that Congress had no power to do so. In choosing the former
course to avoid a constitutional holding that might limit congressional power, the
Court was acting consistently with its handling of the Speech or Debate Clause issue.
The Court avoided the sensitive question of whether a Congressman is judicially ac-
countable for an unconstitutional discharge of an employee. Thus, Davis could be cited
as an example of the Court's reluctance to decide sensitive issues that go to the heart
of the relationship between two coordinate branches of government, when such deci-
sions are at all avoidable. However, Justice Powell feels that Davis goes too far in en-
croaching on congressional prerogatives; he suggests that Congress might respond to
the Davis decision by limiting federal judicial jurisdiction in an attempt to "reassert
the proper balance between the legislative and judicial branches." 442 U.S. at 255 n.4
(Powell, J., dissenting).
65. 442 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).
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Although the Court spoke in terms of "jurisdiction," the
reference to "no effective means" of enforcing and protecting con-
stitutional rights addresses the issue of relief. Further, the Court,
by stating that Congress could obviate the need for damages by
creating "equally effective alternative remedies," implies that some
remedy must be available.6 In addition, the majority opinion implies
that Congress is powerless to preclude relief totally. Explaining that
the Cort criteria are inapplicable in deciding whether or not a con-
stitutional cause of action exists, the Court stated that Congress
may decide who can enforce statutory rights, but that the question
of who can enforce a constitutional right is a "fundamentally dif-
ferent ... question.""7 One final indication that some remedy is com-
pelled is contained in Justice Powell's dissent, in which he stated, "I
have thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled
discretion when called upon to infer a private cause of action directly
from the Constitution."'8 In his view, "the decision of the Court ...
is not an exercise of principled discretion. It avoids the obligation to
take into account the range of policy and constitutional considera-
tions that we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining
whether a particular remedy should be enacted.""
66. Id. at 248. On May 30, 1979, Representatives Morris Udall, Robert Drinan, and
Patricia Schroeder introduced House Resolution 292, the House Fair Employment
Practices Bill, which would bring Congress into line with provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act. The resolution provides for the creation of a
Fair Employment Relations Board, which is to hear discrimination complaints and to
supervise operations within a Fair Employment Relations Office. In addition to
counselling, the Office offers employees and job applicants who believe themselves to
have been targets of discrimination a procedure for formal and informal complaints.
Either party to a dispute may appeal Board recommendations to the House Ethics
Committee. H.R. REs. 292, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 3906 (daily ed. May
30, 1979).
67. 442 U.S. at 241.
68. 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 254. See note 61, supra, and accompanying text. Arguably, the dif-
ference in approach between Justice Brennan in Davis and Justices Harlan, in Bivens,
and Powell, in Davis, represents a fundamental disagreement as to the extent of
judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction constitutionally granted to it. Justice
Brennan's Davis opinion reflects his support for the view that the Court should adopt
an activist posture and open its doors to plaintiffs whenever they allege a violation of
constitutionally protected rights and no other remedy is provided. Chief Justice Mar-
shall articulated this position in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821),
when he wrote for the Court, "We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given," and in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), in which he stated, "[t]he very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury." See also Justice Fortas' opinion for the ma-
jority in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS 657-62 (2d ed. 1973); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Vir-
[Vol. 41
NOTES
The significance of Davis v. Passman transcended the compensa-
tion of one congressional employee by offering the Court an oppor-
tunity to clarify an important area of constitutional law. But Davis
left to future cases the responsibility of defining precisely the
nature of the Bivens remedy and of determining the point at which
judicial extension of the Bivens rationale will end.70
John Jeffrey Simon
tues'"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV L.
REV. 1 (1959). Justices Harlan and Powell adopt a different approach and argue that
the Court should be able to make quasi-legislative decisions in determining whether or
not to recognize a cause of action. This principle is articulated in A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 121-33 (1962). See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Naim
v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S.
549 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. at 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See
also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 253 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting), citing Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
(wherein the Court refused to decide cases over which it had jurisdiction because of
the principle of comity toward the states).
70. In the very recent case of Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980), a 5-4 Court
held that a private damages remedy could be inferred directly from the eighth amend-
ment, despite the availability of a cause of action for damages under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Brennan, stated that a Bivens-type
cause of action is allowed when 1) there are no special factors counselling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress, and 2) there is no explicit Congressional
preclusion. The Court's consideration of policy issues (such as the appropriateness of
protecting prison officials from suit and the comparative effectiveness of Bivens-type
and FTCA remedies) and its indication that Congress has the authority to modify or
preclude remedies for constitutional violations leave this area of the law where Davis
left it. It is still unclear whether or not the Bivens remedy is constitutionally compelled.
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